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Public sector structural reforms 
A failed counter revolution? 
TONY SIMPSON 
O VER THE PAST 12 YEARS our public service has passed through a process of apparent intense change. 
This change has been both putatively structural and cul-
tural, and has been part of a political counter revolution 
in the larger society. I refer to it as a counter revolution 
because its purpose has been not to strike out in new 
directions but to revert to a previous political agenda -
specifically that which pertained prior to the election of 
the Liberals in 1890. Here, I want to try, firstly, to put the 
matter of public sector structural reform in some sort of 
broader historical context. And secondly, I want to pose 
the question: how successful has this counter revolution 
been in specific relation to the New Zealand public sec-
tor? 
Two things need to be noted at the outset. The first 
is that I will not be talking about our economy. The 
changes of the last decade in that area have been sig-
nificant, but they have not changed the fundamental 
nature of the New Zealand economy which is primarily 
a set of international trading relationships. Those rela-
tionships. are the same as they have always been. That 
is to say we are a small international agricultural trad-
ing nation with few commodities to sell- mainly one as 
a matter of fact, processed grass - in a market place 
which favours the buyer, and about as far from our 
customers as we can be in relation to our competitors. 
That's been the situation more or less since at least 1832 
when Te Rauparaha used the same trading relationship 
to borrow the brig Elizabeth and raid Ngai Tahu at 
Akaroa. 
That's not to say that nothing has changed in the 
detail. What we've been doing recently is to change the 
orientation of that trading relationship. There's noth-
ing new about that either. We've been obliged to do 
that several times over the last century and a half. What 
has always driven this process has been the logic of the 
.WHEN TREASURY FIN~lLY GET Al'OONP TO RESTRUcrOI?INCi THE HUMitN HEART: •• 
() THE EVENING POST 
WE CDNSIDER lHe REutrloNSHIP 
&TWEfN THe L6T AND Rl~tiT 
V£NTRIC~ fS. m~ TOO COS( ... 
- ~ PROR:$N. WOUW sEPAAArE 
THE HfARr tNTV ~ ISOl.hrED 
CHJI~ I.Ol$. fA)~ 
P~ OF 1Hf CHEST, 1HEY WOULD 
1H6J ~ IN~FalDfNTLY ~ 
1HE RI6HT 10 PoMP &000 TO 
Plltmcu£11({ m~ ~ rHC eow. 
COI'o\PErnloN SHOVLP 
1/'A.Pfbl£ ~ CNfl( Jlu.. 
a:st" fFFICitNC1 OF 1HE 
BLOOD VltSCUt.~ st~. 
~~~ 
NEW ZEALAND STUDIES JULY 1997 9 
international market place, and so it has been over the 
last couple of decades. It has nothing to do with any 
initiatives taken here . Those who live here and think 
they are economic innovators are flattering themselves. 
They had no choice in the economic sphere but to go 
along willy nilly with changes dictated by international 
circumstances in the marketplaces in which we trade. 
The real genesis of that change- and one for which we 
prepared ourselves very badly, by the way- was in the 
British decision to join the EEC in the early seventies, 
and in the oil price shocks of the same decade. 
What has happened has been that those changes 
have been conflated with some political changes which 
were not driven by these economic imperatives, but by 
a calculated and long-standing ·agenda on the part of 
certain groups to reverse the political changes heralded 
by the Liberal elections of 1890 and 1893, and consoli-
dated by the Labour election victories of 1935 and 1938. 
These groups, as they have in the past, have taken 
advantage of the need for economic change to advance 
that agenda. The essence of this agenda is the disman-
tling of systems which ensure that all citizens share in 
the fruits of the economy, in favour of a system in 
which only certain restricted groups do. These latter 
may be grouped under the general rubric of 'the de-
serving rich'. 
Secondly, this process, as I have just indicated, did 
not begin with the election of the fourth Labour gov-
ernment in 1984. It had been going on for some time. If 
you want to know more about that you might like to 
read my book A Vision Betrayed which maps that proc-
ess and which, ironically, was published in July 1984 
immediately after the election in that year (although 
like most people I had little inkling of what the election 
heralded) . What happened over the next decade was 
the acceleration of that process by several factors so 
that the desired outcome was achieved very much more 
quickly than its proponents had expected. Attributing 
it to Roger Douglas is about as silly as attributing the 
outbreak of the first world war to Gavril Princep. 
Within the broader context it was fairly obvious 
from the outset that at some point those driving the 
changes would need to address the structure of the 
public service. This was because that service occupied 
a position in the society which constituted a principal 
impediment to the changes they were trying to effect. 
To understand why that was so, it is important to be 
aware of two other things. The first of these relates to 
why the public service was set up the way it was in the 
first place, and the second is to do with the manner in 
which public sector wages are set. If you appreciate 
that one of the main political reversals on the agenda 
was the abandonment of a progressive and 
redistributive tax system, and that one of the principal 
traditional routes for achieving that redistribution was 
the Keynsian device of public sector activity, then the 
imperative necessity of restructuring the public sector 
becomes apparent. Let me take each of those public 
sector origin points in turn. 
When the Liberals came to power in 1890 they found 
that the then civil service was largely hostile to what 
they wanted to do. They spent a good part of the next 
two decades restructuring that civil service to reverse 
that situation. But you can't make an omelette, as they 
say, without breaking eggs. This reorganisation of the 
then civil service had been the origin of a number of 
celebrated political scandals of which the best known 
was the claim that the police had been corrupted into 
serving the liquor interest (which was said to be a prin-
cipal backer of the Liberals). Probably that was true. 
But there were a number of other scandals of the same 
sort. The Webbs, who were in New Zealand during the 
period, thought it was all a storm in a teacup, and 
perhaps from their perspective they were right. It should 
be noted, on the other hand, that the Privy Council in 
London, in the New Zealand case of Wallis and others 
vs Attorney General in 1903 thought it was serious 
enough to comment on and to suggest that the appoint-
ment of New Zealand judges was coloured by it. 
Whether these allegations were true or not the par-
liamentary opposition, revamped as the Reform party, 
had a field day and their vociferous moral indignation 
eventually meant that something had to be done. In 
1912 the abortive last Liberal government of Thomas 
McKenzie actually set up the Hunt Commission to re-
form the public service. By the time Hunt reported 
there was a new Reform government in power, and the 
new Minister, Herdman, who had been leading the 
charge against the alleged political corruption of the 
civil service implemented most of the recommenda-
tions of the Commission. You can read the detail of this 
-which is fascinating- in The Quest for Efficiency, Alan 
Henderson's official history of the origins of the State 
Services Commission. Suffice to say that the upshot 
was the separation of the public service from opportu-
nities for political influence in appointments and 
promotions. This was achieved by a system of inde-
pendent promotion arrangements based on merit and 
clear job descriptions, an independent review process, 
and the establishment of the Public Service Commis-
sion as a Chinese wall between all matters to do with 
public service personnel, and individual ministers and 
the government generally. The public service became a 
career service - you expected to be employed there for 
your entire working life no matter who was the govern-
ment, although your career might range over a number of 
agencies - and it became on offence for any person other 
than the Commission to influence a public service ap-
pointment. Public servants were protected from arbitrary 
dismissal with a comprehensive appeal procedure if a 
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dismissal became necessary for other reasons. This was to 
ensure that this was not a cloak for political jobbery. 
But public servants also accepted significant con-
straints on their rights as citizens. If you were a public 
servant, for example, you had to follow a whole series 
of requirements in your employment which did. not 
apply to anyone else, and for the infringement of which 
you could be sacked. Essentially this remained the sys-
tem, notwithstanding minor amendments, until the 
structural reforms of 1987 and 1988. 
The second factor of which you need to be aware 
relates to public sector wage setting. The basic problem 
to be addressed here is that the normal labour market 
equations - which presuppose a three cornered rela-
tionship between a worker, an employer and a customer 
-do not apply because in the state sector the employer 
and the customer are the same person in different guises. 
Solutions have been attempted to this conundrum in 
many countries, and all have, by and large come up 
with the same outcome- something called fair compa-
rability. That is to say, the payment of public servants 
in particular occupations more or less the same range 
of wages as their private sector counterparts. From the 
end of the second world war to the early sixties there 
was a problem over wage setting in New Zealand which 
was eventually resolved, through the McCarthy Com-
missions of 1962 and 1968, by the adoption of the fair 
comparability principle. This was enshrined in legisla-
tion until it too was swept away in 1987 as part of the 
public sector structural reform process, although it con-
tinued in force in an attenuated form and in practical 
terms until the passage of the Employment Contracts 
Act in 1991. 
This background is necessary for an understanding 
of the public sector structural reforms of the eighties; to 
assess their necessity, their impact, and whether or not 
they have achieved their ostensible purpose (where the 
actual agenda being pursued, differs from their real 
purposes) . 
Certainly those driving change in this area under-
stood it and had clear, if not cogent, reasons for 
reforming the public sector. This is a matter of record. 
These reasons are set out in a range of documents and 
reports, the most important of which are the October 
1986 Review of Pay Fixing in the State Sector and Vol-
ume 1 of Government Management, the Treasury brief to 
the incoming government in 1987. 
The first of these deals primarily, but not solely 
with wages. Both reports characterise the then system 
of public sector wage fixing as highly centralised and 
inflexible. The first characterisation was a matter of 
fact, The second was a highly questionable interpreta-
tion. What was really meant by the stricture was further 
explicated, however, in a passage which described "the 
present system as constraining state sector organisa-
tions from responding quickly and effectively to the 
changing economic climate" . Decoded, this meant that 
wages could not easily be reduced in real terms. In fact 
the reports asserted, entirely in the face of the facts, 
that state sector wages had moved ahead of their pri-
vate sector counterparts. Interestingly this has 
subsequently become the principal justification for state 
sector reform in New Zealand. It has been repeated so 
often that it has taken on the status of a reified fact. I 
last saw it, for example, in a paper tabled by the New 
Zealand government at an ILO conference on public 
sector structural adjustment which I attended in Ge-
neva in 1995. 
The authors of the 1986 paper naturally had some 
solutions available for this pseudo problem. National 
rates of pay and those based on occupational classifica-
tions should be abandoned in favour of the market. 
There should be no more general adjustments to sala-
ries . The ability to recruit and retain staff in the labour 
market- depressed by unemployment- should be the 
principal criterion for setting wages, and should be 
encouraged by the much more widespread use of indi-
vidual contracts of employment. Collective contracts 
should be, said the reports, confined to the low paid as 
a form of social protection, but anyone in the rest of the 
public sector, i.e. about 80% of the work force, did not 
need collective agreements. 
What would be the result of these changes, accord-
ing to the authors of the 1986 and 1987 papers? Well, it 
would ensure that those who delivered innovation and 
efficiency could be compensated and encouraged, and 
those who did not could be punished and dispensed 
with. The outcome would be a much more efficient 
public service, and one moreover which would be 
cheaper to run, ie, would need less taxation. Specifi-
cally, it said "this would enable managers to provide 
remuneration packages that offer staff appropriate in-
centives to perform, that permit responsiveness to 
changing economic conditions, and which encourage 
staff to invest in skills and experience". At the same 
time "it is essential that a revised system involves the 
facility for decentralisation of pay fixing to a level at 
which the management, financial and policy goals of an 
organisation may be considered together in determin-
ing a remuneration package." To the degree that there 
would be collective arrangements, these should be de-
centralised to the enterprise level, and within that 
context individual contracts should be preferred aside 
from certain basic general requirements covering leave, 
sickness and so forth, retained, again, for their social 
safety net utility. 
The legislation enacted in 1988 to implement this 
reform reflects these preoccupations. At a stroke it re-
turned the public sector to the wage fixing arrangements 
which had pertained prior to the McCarthy Commis-
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sions. It made no attempt to address the problems re-
solved since at least 1962 by the application of the 
doctrine of fair comparability, except to vaguely state, 
in line with the general ideology then pertaining, that 
the deregulation that this entailed was automatically a 
good thing, and that the labour market and the mana-
gerial initiative that this deregulation would release 
would suffice to keep everybody fair and honest. As 
might have been expected the reversal of the post 1962 
settlement has simply ensured that the pre-1962 prob-
lems have re-emerged in a slightly different guise. So 
far they have defied resolution, and will continue to do 
so until the principle of fair comparability is re-intro-
duced or re-invented in some form . 
Two other dimensions of this question should be 
noted. Firstly that the same ideological precepts had 
been applied in 1986 to the trading activities of state 
agencies. These were separated out as state owned en-
terprises, a curious hybrid owned by the community, 
governed by a board appointed by ministers, ultimately 
responsible to ministers, and operating in whole or in 
part in the competitive commercial market place. A 
number of these organisations have subsequently been 
sold to private owners, usually at prices which reflect 
their worth nei ther in market terms nor in terms of the 
generations of public investment which they repre-
sented . Presumably, however, this has resolved at least 
in part the labour market conundrum inherent in pub-
lic sector organisations by separating the employer from 
the customer. There is some evidence to suggest that 
this is so, although that outcome is ameliorated by other 
considerations, eg, that the consumer of the services 
delivered is often not the person paying for them, and 
therefore the customer I employer /worker relationship 
predicated by the theoretical labour market still does 
not always exist for these organisations . Ironically, in 
those circumstances special regulatory arrangements 
are often needed to ensure free competitiveness al-
though they haven't always been applied, or if so 
applied effectively. Examples of this are to be found, 
for instance, in the delivery of telephone services or of 
electricity generation. 
The other point of interes t to note is that the dis-
mantling of the system of pay fixing by comparability 
was only partial. The Higher Salaries Commission, 
which sets the salaries of senior public servants, judges, 
politicians and a range of other high ranking public 
officials continues to function on the basis of fair com-
parability. It has always seemed a curiosity to me, by 
the way, that these people, who far more than the rest 
of us are in positions in which the incentive of purely 
market driven wages might encourage to ensure 
wideranging efficiencies in administration,, are excused 
from the rigours of the labour market. The more cynical 
of my acquaintances have, of course, drawn attention 
to the need to keep such people onside in a situation in 
which the general tendency of public sector wages has 
been to fall, by ensuring that the leading lights are not 
subject to this discipline, and thus have no incentive to 
criticise the reformed arrangements because at least 
their wages are going up. Perhaps it's simply that the 
already rich and powerful need different sorts of incen-
tives. Whereas the rest of us need the incentive of less, 
they need the incentive of more. Ernest Hemingway 
once _.sa id to Zelda Fitzgerald that the rich were differ-
ent from those who are not. "That's right," she said, 
"they have more money." My reading of the situation is 
that they intend to keep it that way. 
But the authors of the various papers suggesting 
the structural reforms were well aware that this was 
not just a question of wage fixing arrangements. There 
were other structures which they also thought needed 
to be dismantled to be consistent with their incentive 
driven approach. More specifically: they targeted 
arbitral dispute resolution, which they thought intro-
duced an inappropriate and irrelevant third party into 
the process of wage setting; they wanted to get rid of 
any structures which might protect the position of work-
ers. They thought the rate for the person should replace 
the rate for the job. And they considered that appeals 
against non-promotion to ensure that merit really had 
been the basis for appointment should be abandoned. 
So, have the reforms been successful in retaining 
equity in wage fixing while delivering efficiency in 
government through the release of managerial initia-
tive. That's a clutch of questions so let's take them one 
at a time. 
We'll deal with wages first because that's an easy 
one. The answer is no. And here the figures speak for 
themselves. It depends, of course, and as always with 
figures, when you begin your counting but let's make 
our starting point 1991 because that's when the full 
reform first applied. It's difficult to get absolute preci-
sion because some public servants have had merit 
increases during that period and those are not centrally 
mapped. I think, however, that their effect should be 
discounted at least in some measure, because those 
increases are for individual improvement in perform-
ance, and what we're interested in is the overall value 
of wages. In this area the claim that the reforms deliver 
equity immediately dissolves in the face of the facts . 
Since 1991 the real value of public sector wages has 
fallen by 12-15% measured against inflation, ie, what 
those wages could buy then and what they can buy 
now. These figures are based upon the statistical indi-
ces published by Statistics New Zealand. In real terms 
they mean that someone who had their last pay in-
crease in the June quarter of 1992, and who was on 
$34,000 a year (which is quite a good salary in public 
service terms), by June 1996 had lost $44.57 worth of 
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purchasing power per week. It's undeniable, of course, 
that some professional groups have seen significant 
increases in their remuneration, but in relation to the 
public sector work force as a whole this group is tiny. If 
you are a public servant then you may get salary equity 
or even some relative advantage from the new set up, 
but statistically the lucky winner is thoroughly unlikely 
to be you. In addi-
tion to that, as 
we'll see in a mo-
ment, the winners 
are unlikely to be 
so on the basis of 
rational considera-
tions of merit. The 
current system is a 
Lotto pay fixing 
system, and is 
about as likely to 
deliver equity as 
Lotto does. 
The real ef-
fects of this can be 
very readily 
mapped in the staff 
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turnover figures. This is one of the few sets of figures kept 
comprehensively these days by the State Services Com-
mission. The public service turnover for the year to 30 
June 1994 was 17.8%; to June 1995 it was 20.4%; and to 
June 1996 it was 21.8%. Any management specialist will 
tell you that a turnover rate of more than 10% is grounds 
for alarm. According to the theory set out by the propo-
nents of the 1988 reforms, this situation should have been 
self correcting. The need to retain efficient and effective 
staff should have ensured that wages went up and not 
down. Of course, it's possible to argue, I suppose that 
those who went were the inefficient and incompetent, 
and so, good riddance. But if that was so then they should 
have been replaced by the efficient and competent - in 
which case the overall level of wages should have gone 
up even faster. As I've just said, however, they went 
down over the period of five years. It's a funny sort of 
system which rewards efficiency and ability by reduc-
ing wages. 
Of course the proponents of a free market had ig-
nored two important considerations. The first was that 
the private sector, where wages were also falling in real 
terms, was nevertheless paying better wages for simi-
lar workers than the public sector. This not only 
attracted people away but it tended to attract the most 
highly valued. This, incidentally, was the very reason 
why the principle of fair comparability had to be ap-
plied in New Zealand in 1962. The problem it sets out 
to resolve applies whether or not we are in a period of 
full employment or significant unemployment. This sug-
gests, that what we are dealing with here are structural 
problems which have nothing to do with simplistic no-
tions concerning the way the labour market is supposed 
to work. 
Secondly, the reformers had failed to take account 
of the factor I noted earlier: that the employer and the 
customer for services are the same person. If the gov-
ernment as 
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customer insists 
on reducing the 
price paid irre-
spective of the 
delivery of pro-
ductive efficiency 
per unit of output 
per worker, then 
the government as 
employer achieves 
an outcome not of 
efficiency but of 
cheapness. That 
doesn't mean that 
efficiency is ruled 
out, but it does 
make it much 
harder to achieve, because efficiency depends upon the 
effective application of both capital investment and hu-
man resource. To limit the availability of both by 
underfunding government agencies invites managers 
to cut corners. This is not only a recipe for bad manage-
ment in itself. It also means that there is a temptation to 
find the necessary investment by reducing pay-roll, ei-
ther by reducing staff or reducing wages, or both. And 
this is exactly what has happened in the public service. 
Not only that, but the marginalisation of trade unions 
has meant that one of the major previous checks on 
managerial competence has been removed. Unions 
tended to police the system and identify management 
inefficiencies. They now find that much more difficult 
because they have been quite deliberately written out 
of the equations. 
So one of the outcomes of the reform process has 
been the delivery of the opposite result to that intended 
-less efficiency, not more. That has real consequences 
as the disaster at Cave Creek showed. It's interesting 
that the enquiry into that tragedy put its finger squarely 
on the problem- endemic under funding and the result-
ant corner cutting- but no-one has drawn the obvious 
condusion which is that the reforms of the public sec-
tor have been, quite literally in the case of Cave Creek, 
a disaster. 
Instead the proponents of the reforms draw the 
opposite conclusion. They say that the greater trans-
parency of the public sector has shown up the inherent 
inefficiency of the public service, and that there would 
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be fewer tragedies if more of it could be transferred to 
the private sector. Well, I'm afraid that naive proposi-
tions of that sort don't appeal to me. The world is a 
much more complicated place than simple minded eco-
nomic rationalists imagine. 
So let 's now turn to the broader question of whether 
or not the reforms in general have created a more effi-
cient and effective public sector. I have considerable 
assistance in drawing my conclusions here because there 
have been a series of independent review reports on 
that question. I'm going to draw on four of the more 
significant of these in what I'm about to say. 
Let me begin with a most interesting March 1995 
study conducted by Richard Norman of the Manage-
ment Group at Victoria University and entitled 
Re-invented governmen t - the New Zealand experience. 
Norman and some colleagues went to a group of senior 
civil servants and asked them what they thought had 
been the outcomes of the reform process. Bear in mind 
that this is the group who might have been most ex-
pected to say that it had been a success. Norman did it 
in a way which was immediately interactive and which 
at the same time protected the anonymity of the re-
spondents, by using linked computer technology 
recording responses to various trigger questions at a 
central point, and coordinating and ordering these re-
sponses for significance with the group afterwards. 
The outcome was remarkable . All agreed that the 
introduction of accrual, output based accounting had 
been a success, with a caveat about the inadequacy of 
planning to introduce it and a higher level of start-up 
cost as a result. I don't think that there's any significant 
disagreement with that. It is now much easier to iden-
tify, than it was before 1989, what departmental funding 
is being spent on and whether or not the determined 
outcome is being achieved. This does not, of course, 
prevent spectacular pile-ups any more than in the past 
- the National Library computer project, and social 
welfare training, are cases in point - but these things 
are detected sooner and are harder to bury than they 
were in the past. Many managers now have a much 
better sense than in the past as to what they are trying 
to achieve and what resources they will have to do it. 
This allows them to plan strategically rather than op-
erationally, and those who have taken advantage of 
that have delivered excellent outcomes and done so 
efficient! y. 
But Norman's senior managers also thought that 
the drive to separate policy and delivery agencies had 
not worked and was conceptually unreliable; that the 
use of more flexible employment contracts had under-
mined loyalty and created a short term focus that 
worked against the broader advantages of the reform; 
that the establishment of a direct relationship with min-
isters had proved problematical and created significant 
areas of mistrust which had very likely had a negative 
effect on performance; and that the management of the 
change process had been abominably handled, and that 
this had been entirely unnecessary. A very mixed re-
port card from those most favourably disposed to the 
process of reform. 
There has also been a very interesting study of the 
changing nature of public service managers and their 
attitudes since reform by Robert Gregory who has pub-
lished the outcome in Political Science for December 
1995. There has been a significant change, Gregory dis-
covered, in the professional qualifications of managers 
joining the public service. The arts and humanities 
group has fallen from 35% pre 1988 to 19% post 1988, 
whereas the business and accountancy group has risen 
from 18% to 33%. Engineers have trebled, scientists 
have doubled, and lawyers and sociologists have halved 
over the same period, although the size of the sample 
used means that the result in respect of engineers should 
be cautiously treated. This change reflects, obviously, 
the operational requirements underlying the reforms 
themselves and in particular the requirements of the 
Public Finance Act 1989. But this has been accompa-
nied by an important sea change in the attitudes of 
those running the public service. The post-reform man-
agers are significantly less likely to be at ease with 
pluralist politics, less democratically sensitive, and more 
technocratic in orientation than their pre reform coun-
terparts. They are also significantly less likely to 
perceive the overriding necessity for serving the elected 
parliament through accepting the authority of the min-
ister as paramount. This is not to say that they would 
deliberately flout the ministerial will. Rather it is to say 
that they see their work as driven by professional im-
peratives rather than democratic responsiveness. One 
of these sets of imperatives is an orientation towards 
the methods of working and philosophies of private 
business. Another interesting subset of attitudes is that 
the post-reform managers are significantly less favour-
able towards policies directed to the recruitment of 
women and Maori to the public service. (This is con-
sistent by the way with some previous studies of private 
sector business attitudes). 
The study does not ask if these changes are a good 
thing or a bad thing but simply records them, so let me 
essay a comment of my own. I suggest that this devel-
opment, which undoubtedly stems, at least in main 
part, from the reform process itself, is thoroughly un-
desirable . One of the things which characterises New 
Zealand political culture is its democratic, egalitarian, 
and open and responsive nature. The functioning of a 
public sector which genuinely delivers those values 
and serves citizens requires managers who share that 
ethos. The numbers of those who do is declining. They 
have been replaced by adherents of a technocratic ethos 
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in which the primary values are profitability, the appli-
cation of balance sheet criteria in assessing success in 
outcomes, a downgrading of social considerations as a 
determinant in policy advice, and a measure of secre-
tiveness in day to day affairs suitable to competitive 
commercial organisations but which consorts ill with 
the philosophy of open and transparent government. 
The changing nature of our public sector manage-
ment ethos also seems to me to be inconsistent with 
MMP. If we are to properly implement a new govern-
ment system based on mediative political skills and on 
workable compromise solutions acceptable to the 
broader political culture as the criteria of success in 
administration, rather than the adoption of solutions 
felt by their proponents to be the right thing to do on 
professional or elitist grounds then we are employing 
the wrong managers to manage it. 
Thirdly, and most recently, we have the report, 
published in August 1996 and prepared by Alien Schick 
of the University of Maryland and a consultant to the 
OECD. This was intended as an overview of the reform 
process. Reading between his polite periods (and the 
fact that Treasury and the State Services Commission 
made him rewrite his report six times I'm told), Schick 
is quite critical of the outcomes of the last eight years. 
He draws attention at the outset to the fact that the 
reforms were driven ideologically i.e. based on the be-
lief that the public sector needed reforming rather than 
any objective study which identified such a need in the 
real world. And within that framework he concludes 
that the reforms, while broadly worthwhile in improv-
ing the efficiency and quality of public services, have 
serious drawbacks which need to be addressed . He iden-
tifies three principal such drawbacks. 
Firstly, those driving the public service are still not 
thinking strategically, although they are addressing this 
process, which is assisted by some of the requirements 
of the Fiscal Responsibility Act. Secondly, the costs of 
public services are still not being adequately identified 
and so it continues to be difficult for managers to man-
age adequately. And thirdly, accountability based upon 
management of clearly defined and funded outputs con-
tinues to elude managers because of the continued 
appearance of unanticipated requirements and 
deliverables for which they have not been funded . 
The fourth study to which I draw attention was 
published in 1996 by the Strategic Human Resource 
Development Branch of the State Services Commission. 
This also asked a wide range of senior managers in the 
public sector whether they thought the reforms were 
carrying us in the right direction. It took as its point of 
departure the earlier 1991 Review of the State Sector 
Reforms convened by Basil Logan - the Logan Report. 
Logan described three areas of what he called "risk" in 
public sector management i.e. where the reforms might 
fail to a greater or lesser degree in delivering efficiency 
and economy if these problem areas were not addressed. 
These were: a lack of attention to the collective inter-
ests of government in a decentralised structure and the 
need for a greater level of coordination; the need for 
chief executives to look beyond the boundaries of their 
agencies to address this collective interest; and the need 
for central agencies to enhance their acceptance of re-
sponsibility in this area. All of these matters to a greater 
or lesser degree entailed attention to human resources 
policy. 
And to a greater or lesser degree, the 1996 study 
found, the problems identified by Logan remained 
unaddressed, or where they had been addressed they 
had re-emerged in new forms. The State Services Com-
mission was not providing sufficient strategic guidance, 
the report found, although some steps had been taken 
to rectify this. In particular, there had been a failure to 
meet legislative requirements in respect of responsive-
ness to Maori (the conclusions of the report say nothing 
about women and the disabled), and to invest in hu-
man resource capability. Once again a report written 
by insiders concluded that the reforms had fallen short 
of their goals. 
What do these four analyses mean when they are 
decoded? They mean that the agendas at work are not 
those they pretend to be. The things that the review 
reports identify as not happening are not happening 
because they are not meant to happen. There is another 
agenda in place instead. 
Decentralisation is central to this agenda because it 
is the best way of identifying areas for privatisation or 
contracting out. Protecting the collective interest of gov-
ernment cuts across that process because the agenda at 
work takes as a basic proposition that the collective 
interest of government is minimal. The collective inter-
ests of socially defined groups such as Maori (and by 
implication women and the disabled) are not a priority 
because they are irrelevant to the strategic outcomes 
desired by the reform i.e . the reduction of the cost both 
operationally and in terms of risk, of government itself. 
The agenda is fundamentally predicated on the desir-
ability of the lowest possible level of taxation compatible 
with minimal government. Identifying a partnership 
interest to be served is inimical to that requirement in a 
reformed public sector context. It is perceived as an 
unnecessary expenditure which is better dealt with in a 
market context i.e. Maori should pool their resources 
and look after themselves . 
And I barely need mention the low priority ac-
corded investment in public sector human resource 
capability. That capability, insofar as it is scarce, can be 
purchased as consultancy in the market place as re-
quired. Permanent human resource capability in the 
public sector should be confined to a managerial elite 
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recruited from elsewhere as needed. As to the rest of 
the workforce, they should comprise the smallest pos-
sible number of process workers, preferably engaged 
on a casual basis and requiring little or no human re-
source investment beyond basic familiarisation training. 
It 's an interesting irony that all significant reviews 
of their efficacy have identified genuine shortcomings 
in the implementation of the reforms but that nothing 
has been done to rectify this. This is a puzzle until one 
grasps that the presence of two agendas, one ostensible 
and the other real, has militated against the implemen-
tation of improvements. The real agenda is, of course, 
the one to which I alluded at the outset, viz, the coun-
ter-revolutionary one of ininimal government and low 
taxation with minimum impediments to business which 
was the way New Zealand was run before John Balance 
upset the apple cart by inaugurating democracy in New 
Zealand in 1890. 
To the four review assessments I have instanced I 
would add a consideration of my own which all the 
others have missed, possibly for obvious reasons . This 
is what I would describe as a thoroughgoing 
politicisation of the public sector. Many public agen-
cies have been removed from public control and handed 
to boards of management whose agendas are business 
oriented. Business agendas are, of course, political agen-
das. I refer in particular to state owned enterprises, and 
bodies such as those delivering health services or a 
range of activities previously undertaken by local gov-
ernment. This politicisation cuts very deep. As well as 
implying a particular political agenda it also has meant 
that those who serve those organisations as managers 
and policy advisers are required to conform to those 
agendas or they either are not employed in the first 
place or do not last long if they are. The same applies to 
the public service. 
The previous appointment system was based on 
merit as was the independent appea l authority over-
seeing it. This has been abandoned, there is no check on 
the process of appointment of managers and policy 
advisors for frankly political reasons, which has pro-
ceeded apace. A little remarked review study by the 
State Services Commission on the purchase of policy 
advice from government departments published in De-
cember 1991 concluded that the giving of such advice 
should be confined to professional policy analysts and 
that one of the defining credentials of that profession 
should be some evidence of having undergone training 
in the philosophical tenets of neoclassical economics. 
Perhaps the greatest irony of all has been that a 
reform process proudly touted by its architects as look-
ing to the future has actually recreated the civil service 
as it existed prior to the Hunt Commission in 1912. But 
let me go beyond irony and attempt to answer the ques-
tion with which I commenced. Has the reform suc-
ceeded in its intent? The answer to that depends upon 
how you measure success. Probably the Treasury and 
the Business Round Table would agree with me in say-
ing that it has not succeeded but our reasons would be 
different. They think it has not gone far enough, rather 
than too far. We should therefore confine ourselves to 
measuring success by the intentions of those who wrote 
the reports of 1986 and 1987 which began the process, 
and see how the outcomes compare to their predic-
tions. 
Has it delivered a more equitable and efficient wage 
setting system? No it hasn't. Wages have fallen in real 
terms and although a few high fliers get more there's 
nothing to suggest that that is because they are more 
efficient, nor that the system itself is delivering better 
outcomes. There is ample evidence to suggest that the 
opposite may have occurred, that is, a decline in effi-
ciency and effectiveness. Certainly that has been the 
experience of ordinary citizens as consumers of serv-
ices, and if they are not to be the ultimate arbiters of 
success in this process of reform then I don't know who 
is. 
Secondly, are managers more effective and effi-
cient than they used to be? This is arguable but 
ultimately I don't think so. At best there's evidence 
both ways and some of it suggests quite strongly that 
we've got it wrong and that the managers we now get 
are not the ones we ultimately want because they will 
not deliver the outcomes that citizens want . 
Thirdly, I agree with Schick. We can't go back and 
probably nobody wants to But there is a good deal of 
unfinished business to attend to. There is still a long 
way to go before people learn to think strategically, 
and there is still a lack of skill and expertise in costing 
service delivery. We are similarly a long way from ef-
fective structures of accountability in delivery. The 
single great advance has been in the introduction of 
output based accrual accounting; no-one I have ever 
spoken to wants to return to the previous input system. 
But we have thrown out the baby with the 
bathwater. It was not necessary to pass the State Sector 
and State Owned Enterprise Acts to achieve the posi-
tives we have achieved in terms of the Public Finance 
and Fiscal Responsibility Acts. In the process we have 
lost the advantage of a non-political public service, 
demoralised much of the public sector workforce, and 
made the rest extremely cynical. These are recipes for a 
high risk of the break down of public service integrity, 
an ethos and culture which is fundamental to the 
achievement of the outcomes we want as a society. We 
must now take steps, I think, to rescue the baby before 
it dies of pneumonia and the other deleterious effects 
of going down the drain. 
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